One cannot be a whole, and cannot have parts, for then it would not be one, but many. But if it has no parts it has no beginning, middle, or end, and is formless. It is then in no place, for it cannot be in itself, since the container must be different from the thing contained; nor can it be in other, for it would have to be encircled by that other, and touched in many parts, which is impossible. It follows that it can neither be at rest nor in motion. Not in motion; for it cannot have change in itself, or it would no longer be one; nor can it have motion in place, whether circular motion upon a centre or motion from place to place; the former for the reason that circular motion implies a centre and parts around the centre; and the latter because one is in no place: and as to coming into being in anything, which may be regarded as a kind of motion, while doing this it would have to be part in and part not in, which is impossible. It cannot be at rest, for one is never in the same; to be in the same, is to be in something which is the same, and one cannot be in anything. Nor, farther, can one be the same with itself or other, nor other than itself or other. If other than itself it would not be one; and if the same with other it would be that other, and not itself. On the other hand only other can be the other of other, and not one; and the one cannot be the same with itself, for the nature of the one is not the nature of the same, since that which becomes the same with the many does not become one. Finally, one cannot be like or unlike itself or other, for likeness is sameness of affections, and sameness is not oneness; one must, however, have no affection except oneness, or it becomes more than one. It cannot, then, have the same affections as itself or other. As, for the same reason, it cannot have other affections than itself or other, it cannot be unlike.