Let us take, first, a number of resembling objects in a single consciousness. I have already pointed out that when we say several such objects are the same we do not at all mean to deny that they are distinct objects. We merely wish to indicate that each possesses certain elements which, taken by themselves, and after making abstraction from all other elements, render impossible any distinction between different objects. We distinguish two objects as two through some difference, even if it be only local or temporal. Redness combined with x and redness combined with y are recognized as two occurrences of redness, but this only on account of x and y. Redness perceived to-day and redness perceived yesterday are two occurrences of redness, marked as such by the "to-day" and the "yesterday." Redness considered simply contains nothing which will allow of such distinctions. This does not imply at all that redness considered simply is _an occurrence of redness_--that since we have not two or more occurrence of the quality we have a single occurrence of it, an individual. We have not, if we have really abstracted from all save the redness, any "occurrence" or "occurrences" at all, for these imply just the elements of difference which we are endeavoring to eliminate. An "occurrence" of redness means redness with a difference which will mark it out from other redness, from another "occurrence." If, then, one gives to twenty individuals a common name to indicate that they resemble each other, or are in some sense the same, he should keep clearly in mind just what this means. It means that along with various differing elements each contains the element x. He should remember that each individual is the same with each other individual only in this sense, sense fourth. When he proposes to separate the x from the other elements, and consider it separately, he should be most careful to see that he is really taking it separately, and not allowing shreds of foreign matter to hang to it and give rise to difficulties and perplexities. He should not overlook the fact that there is a fallacy in the very question, Whether the x in one individual is identical (the same in sense first) with the x in any other individual? If these two x's are distinguishable as in two individuals, one is not considering x merely, but x with other elements. The separation of the x element from the other elements in the objects is here not complete, or one would be considering not "an x" or "x's," but x. Any one who sees this must see that he who asks such a question is retaining a duality, and then trying to get out of it an identity with no element of duality. He is "milking the he-goat." He is trying to reduce sameness in sense fourth to sameness in sense first.