He takes up in the "Principles," for the purpose of refuting it, the objection that his doctrine makes things every moment annihilated and created anew.[58] This, he argues, "will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them." [58] §§ 45-48, pp. 178-180. To the reader of Mill it is clear enough that Berkeley is not content to assume potential existence as an integral part of the life history of an object. It seems odd that he should not do so, as he has himself pointed out the double sense of the word exist.[59] However, he demands actual existence. Any lapse in the actual existence of the immediate object seems to him a destruction of the object. He has the common feeling that it is contrary to nature that things should be destroyed and created from moment to moment. They must exist continuously. They evidently do not actually exist continuously in the one mind. So he assumes that, during the periods of their absence from one mind, they must exist in another: otherwise they could not be said to exist at all. [59] "Principles," §3, p. 157. Of course, all this assumes that the objects in one mind are identically (sense first) the objects in another. If they be recognized as two distinct things, belonging to different worlds--worlds so different that what is in one can enter the other only through its representative--the whole argument is seen to be fallacious. One can no more make a consistent whole of elements taken from two different consciousnesses, than one can piece out a grief with a smell. The attempt is the result of overlooking the duality implied in sameness in sense sixth. SEC. 33. There is a clear and forcible passage in John Stuart Mill's "System of Logic," in which he distinguishes certain samenesses from certain others. It is to be regretted that he dismissed the subject with so slight an examination, for it could not but have gained by a careful analysis at the hands of this keen man. I quote more particularly to bring out what Mill has to say about sameness in sense second.