On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
Every careful reader of the extract given above must see that the
Absolute with which Mr. Spencer's argument is concerned is an Absolute
in consciousness. It is "an indefinite consciousness," "raw material
of consciousness," an "indefinite thought," an "abstract of _all_
thoughts, ideas, or conceptions." It is the element of existence
which is common to all these thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. If
there could be any doubt as to the nature of this Absolute in which
the argument results, it should be set at rest by the very emphatic
statement that "our consciousness of the unconditioned" is "literally
the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thought to which
in thinking we give definite forms." It is this "undifferentiated
substance of consciousness which is conditional anew in every
thought" that remains with us as an Absolute through all forms of the
conditioned.
Now this Absolute, the element of existence which accompanies all other
elements in consciousness, is the only one with which the argument has
at all concerned itself, and yet this is evidently not the Absolute in
which the author is chiefly interested. There can be no good reason
for calling this Absolute either Unknowable, Incomprehensible, or
Inscrutable. It is not a "Power" for it is simply the element of
existence, nor is it a "Reality," for the "abstract of _all_ thoughts,
ideas, or conceptions" must be common to the unreal or imaginary as
well as to the real. It is (mental) existence pure and simple. If the
argument be good, this element is known completely and just as it is;
indefinitely, it is true, but then it is indefinite, and if known
definitely would not be known as it is. There is nothing farther about
it to know. It is in no sense Unknowable. If the objection be to the
use of the word "know" where the knowledge is indefinite, we should
invent some word to apply to an indefinite consciousness; but such
consciousness, if denied to be knowledge, should not be classed with
ignorance. Moreover, as knowledge is of all degrees of definiteness,
we should need a series of words to express the gradations. The series
would be a long one.
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