But the Absolute which interests Mr. Spencer, and which throws that halo of the mysterious about his philosophy, is a something distinct from the Absolute in consciousness, and not known as it is. It is by no means that which is common to "impressions" made upon us, but the something assumed to make these impressions. It is "under," "apart from," and "behind" appearances and modes--which an Absolute, which is simply that which is common to appearances and modes, cannot be. Phenomena (the things immediately known) are only "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon,"[62] and this Absolute cannot take its place among phenomena, as the former must. The two Absolutes are, indeed, quite distinct things: one of them, the one in consciousness, has been shown to exist; no argument is forthcoming to prove the existence of the other. Manifestly it is not immediately known, for then it would be a phenomenon, however indefinite. Upon what ground is it inferred? It is the old problem of Descartes and Locke. [62] "First Principles." Chap. V, § 27, p. 99. This problem Mr. Spencer solves in the same way as they, by assuming the "external" object to be given immediately; but there is this important difference, that whereas Descartes and Locke fall into the error from inadvertence, the author of the "First Principles" and the "Principles of Psychology" embraces it deliberately. The two earlier writers were sometimes able to recognize as two things a something in consciousness and an assumed something without. They confused them only now and then. Mr. Spencer has been unable to distinguish them with clearness at any time, and he elevates the confusion into a principle. "The postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out, is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations--that we certainly know we have these, and that if there be anything beyond these serving as cause for them, it can be known only by inference from them. "I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if I call in question this postulate; and the surprise will rise into astonishment if I distinctly deny it. Yet I must do this. Limiting the proposition to those epi-peripheral feelings produced in us by external objects (for these are alone in question) I see no alternative but to affirm that the thing primarily known, is not that a sensation has been experienced, but that there exists an outer object."[63] [63] "Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chap. VI, N. Y., 1883, Vol. II, p. 369. "The question here is--What does consciousness directly testify? And the direct testimony of consciousness is, that Time and Space are not within but without the mind; and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent."[64] [64] "First Principles," Part I, Chap. III, § 15, ed. cit. p. 49.