On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
The theory that pleasure follows increased vitality, and pain
decreased vitality, is supplemented or opposed in modern psychology
by the theory that feeling depends on function: that pleasure is the
concomitant of medium activities,[182] or of conscious functioning,
which is unimpeded and not overstrained[183]--pain accompanying the
opposite condition. The objection urged against this view, that it
leaves the so-called "passive pleasures" out of account, seems to be
made without sufficient consideration of what is meant by attributing
passivity to pleasure. All that such an expression can denote, would
appear to be that, in the pleasurable experience referred to, no
exercise of the muscles is implied, not that such an experience can
take place without any conscious activity on the part of the subject.
At the same time, the theory that pleasure in all cases depends
upon function, must be admitted to be obliged to call in the aid of
hypothesis in order to explain all the facts. If the generalisation
required by the theory can be made out, it must be by emphasising
the fact that feeling is never properly regarded as purely passive,
but implies subjective reaction; and by supposing that the variation
of feeling between pleasure and pain depends on a difference in the
character of this subjective reaction. At the same time, the complete
accuracy of this generalisation is not of vital importance here, as
it is mainly with the feeling which manifestly results from activity
or functioning that we are concerned.
[Sidenote: Modification of pleasurable characteristics of objects]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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