On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
Whether pleasure depends upon increase of vital energy, or upon
unimpeded or medium functioning, it must be subject to modification
along with the conditions under which life may continue and increase,
or the modes of activity which may be carried on without opposition
and in moderation. This constant modification of the objects in
which one takes pleasure, or which give one pain, is, indeed, a fact
which must be admitted by any theory of feeling. A state of mind may
be at first pleasurable; but, if it be long-continued, the pleasure
will give way to the pain of monotony. The same is true of a painful
state of mind: its continuance does not prolong the same intensity
of painful consciousness, but the sensibility becomes dulled and
the pain diminishes. The transition is still more striking in the
case of motor activities. In learning to walk, or to ride, or to
play any instrument, the first experiences are those of painful
effort. Gradually, however, the co-ordinations of movement required
entail less and less pain, till the feeling passes over into its
opposite, and we have a pleasurable sense of successful effort and
well-adapted functioning. But, just as pain gave way to pleasure, so
pleasure itself subsides, the action becomes merely reflex and passes
out of consciousness altogether, unless it be so long continued as
to produce fatigue--that is, pain. Habit, as Dumont remarks,[184]
intensifies perceptions, but weakens pleasure and pain.
[Sidenote: suggests that feeling depends on objective intensity.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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