On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
he ought to subordinate it to the pleasures of the "greatest number"?
[Sidenote: 3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism.
Right action will imply]
[Sidenote: (_a_) correct estimate of consequences of action,]
[Sidenote: (_b_) and corresponding strength of feeling.]
It is a matter of fact, however, that the psychologists who maintain
that action follows the greatest pleasure--meaning by that, greatest
apparent or greatest present pleasure--have in their ethics made the
transition to an enlightened Egoism, or even to Utilitarianism. The
nature of the transition thus requires to be more clearly pointed
out. If the former interpretation of the law of psychological
hedonism could be accepted, and a man's motive for action were always
what seemed to him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the
whole, ethics--what Bentham calls private ethics--could be reduced
(as Bentham finally reduces it) to certain maxims of prudence. To
be fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and pain, and to
estimate them correctly, would imply possession of the highest
(egoistic) morality. If men could be made to think rightly as to what
their greatest pleasure consisted in, then right action on their
part--that is to say, the pursuit of their greatest pleasure--would
(according to Bentham's psychology) follow as a matter of course.
Right conduct, however, is not so purely an affair of the intellect
as this would make it. Indeed, Bentham's psychological assumption
requires only to be plainly stated for its inconsistency with
the facts of human action to become apparent. The "video meliora
proboque, deteriora sequor" expresses too common an experience to be
so easily explained away. The impulses by which action is governed
are not always in accordance with what the intellect decides to
be best on a survey of the whole life and its varied chances. In
judging the consequences of action, a future good is compared with a
present, regardless of the mere difference of time by which they are
separated. But the springs which move the will are often at variance
with the decisions of the understanding; and many men are unable to
resist the strength of the impulse to act for the pleasure of the
moment, though they foresee that a greater future satisfaction would
follow from present self-denial.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account