On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
The "social sanction" would be of much greater service if used to
show how a solidarity is brought about between the interests and
feelings of the individual and those of his neighbours, from which
the utilitarian maxim may be arrived at by a generalisation of his
principle of conduct as modified by the social impulse. But this
would not constitute a logical justification of utilitarianism: it
would show how the principle has been arrived at, but without giving
a sufficient reason to the individual for adopting it. And this is
really the tendency of much recent discussion--of Professor Bain's
theory of conscience as a reflex of the external order, of George
Grote's analysis of the moral sentiment, and of Mill's doctrine of
the progressive identification of the individual's feelings with
those of his neighbours through the gradual increase of sympathetic
pleasures and pains: for it was to this source that Mill looked for
the practical solution of the antinomy between his psychological and
ethical theories, though he himself tried to pass from one position
to the other by means of the "highway in the air" constructed by his
own logic.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: 4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism:]
Mill's attempt to pass by a logical method from psychological
hedonism to utilitarianism is an instructive commentary on the
difficulties which beset the transition. His work may be described
as a vindication of the utilitarian morality, first, from the charge
of sensualism; and secondly, from that of selfishness. And it is
largely owing to his polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looked
upon as either a sensual or a selfish theory. It is not sensual,
unless, indeed, the pleasures of most men are of a sensual kind. So
far from being selfish, it is almost stoical in the subordination of
individual desires it enjoins. But Mill wished to do more than clear
the character of utilitarian ethics. He wished to show a logical
reason for utilitarians pursuing elevated pleasures rather than base
ones, and to demonstrate the connection of his moral imperative with
the principles which the school he belonged to laid down for human
motives. In both these respects his failure is conspicuous.
[Sidenote: (_a_) distinction of kinds of pleasure,]
[Sidenote: determined by authority,]
[Sidenote: either can be reduced to difference of quantity, or leads
to non-hedonistic standard;]
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