On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
But this first attitude of evolution to utilitarianism was not fitted
to be permanent; and the "start"[138] Mr Spencer got on being classed
with anti-utilitarians must have been repeated in the experience
of other moralists as they found themselves drifting from their
ancient moorings. Mr Spencer's difference from the utilitarians is
not such as to lead him to reject or modify their principle. He
maintains, as strongly as they do, that "the ultimately supreme end"
is "happiness special and general."[139] But he disagrees with them
in method, holding that, owing to the incommensurability of a man's
different pleasures and pains, and to the incommensurability of the
pleasures and pains of one man with those of others, coupled with the
indeterminateness of the means required to reach so indeterminate an
end, happiness is not fitted to be the immediate aim of conduct.[140]
But another method is open to us. For "since evolution has been,
and is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that
conforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved,
is furthering that end."[141] It is possible "to deduce, from the
laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action
necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce
unhappiness."[142] Greatest pleasure, that is to say, is the end. But
it is so impossible to compare different kinds of pleasure, different
people's pleasure, and different means for obtaining a maximum of it,
that it is not a practical end for aiming at. No doubt is expressed
that greatest happiness is the ultimate end; although no good reason
is given for holding that it is. But it is an indeterminate end, and
needs to be interpreted by the course of evolution which is held to
tend to it. It is not too much to say, therefore, that Mr Spencer is
only nominally a utilitarian. His ethical principles are not arrived
at by an estimate of the consequences of action, but by deduction
from the laws of that "highest life" which is now in process of
evolution. This alliance between evolutionism and hedonism will be
examined in the following chapter. At present it is necessary to
consider the reasons which have led other evolutionists to look upon
the new morality as superseding the utilitarian end.
[Sidenote: and in principle.]
[Sidenote: (_a_) Ideal of utilitarianism objected to as
unprogressive.]
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