In using such expressions as 'sound Reason teaches this,' or 'Reason should control passion,' we by no means imply that Reason furnishes material knowledge out of its own resources; but rather do we point to the results of rational reflection, that is, to logical inference from principles which abstract knowledge has gradually gathered from experience and by which we obtain a clear and comprehensive view, not only of what is empirically necessary, and may therefore, the case occurring, be foreseen, but even of the reasons and consequences of our own deeds also. _Reasonable_ or _rational_ is everywhere synonymous with _consistent_ or _logical_, and conversely; for Logic is only Reason's natural procedure itself, expressed in a system of rules; therefore these expressions (rational and logical) stand in the same relation to one another as theory and practice. Exactly in this same sense too, when we speak of a reasonable conduct, we mean by it one which is quite consistent, one therefore which proceeds from general conceptions, and is not determined by the transitory impression of the moment. By this, however, the morality of such conduct is in no wise determined: it may be good or bad indifferently. Detailed explanations of all this are to be found in my "Critique of Kant's Philosophy,"[137] and also in my "Fundamental Problems of Ethics."[138] Notions derived from _pure Reason_ are, lastly, those which have their source in the _formal_ part, whether intuitive or reflective, of our cognitive faculty; those, consequently, which we are able to bring to our consciousness _à priori_, that is, without the help of experience. They are invariably based upon principles which have transcendental or metalogical truth. [137] "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 _et seqq._; 3rd edition, p. 610 _et seq._ [138] Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 152; 2nd edition, p. 149 _et seq._