A conception contains _implicite_ all its essential predicates, so that they may be developed out of it _explicite_ by means of mere analytical judgments: the sum total of them being its definition. This definition therefore differs from the conception itself merely in form and not in content; for it consists of judgments which are all contained within that conception, and therefore have their reason in it, in as far as they show its essence. We may accordingly look upon these judgments as the consequences of that conception, considered as their reason. Now this relation between a conception and the judgments founded upon it and susceptible of being developed out of it by analysis, is precisely the relation between Spinoza's so-called God and the world, or rather between the one and only substance and its numberless accidents (_Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis_[28]--_Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa_). It is therefore the relation in knowledge of the _reason_ to its consequent; whereas true Theism (Spinoza's Theism is merely nominal) assumes the relation of the _cause_ to its effect, in which the cause remains different and separate from the consequence, not only in the way in which we consider them, but really and essentially, therefore in themselves to all eternity. For the word God, honestly used, means a cause such as this of the world, with the addition of personality. An impersonal God is, on the contrary, a _contradictio in adjecto_. Now as nevertheless, even in the case as stated by him, Spinoza desired to retain the word God to express substance, and explicitly called this the _cause_ of the world, he could find no other way to do it than by completely intermingling the two relations, and confounding the principle of the reason of knowledge with the principle of causality. I call attention to the following passages in corroboration of this statement. _Notandum, dari necessario unius cujusque rei existentis certam aliquam_ CAUSAM, _propter quam existit. Et notandum, hanc causam, propter quart aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et_ DEFINITIONE _rei existentis_ (_nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere_), _vel debere_ EXTRA _ipsam dari._[29] In the last case he means an efficient cause, as appears from what follows, whereas in the first he means a mere reason of knowledge; yet he identifies both, and by this means prepares the way for identifying God with the world, which is his intention. This is the artifice of which he always makes use, and which he has learnt from Descartes. He substitutes a cause acting from without, for a reason of knowledge lying within, a given conception. _Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ omnia, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, sequi debent._[30] At the same time he calls God everywhere the cause of the world. _Quidquid existit Dei potentiam, quæ omnium rerum_ CAUSA _est, exprimit._[31]--_Deus est omnium rerum_ CAUSA _immanens,