them _principia fiendi_; but it is the coincidence of circumstances on both sides which primarily constitutes that condition, upon which, as cause, the becoming warm depends, as effect. All this leaves no room for Wolf's _principium essendi_, which I therefore do not admit, and concerning which I have here entered somewhat into detail, partly because I mean to use the word myself later on in a totally different sense; partly also, because this explanation contributes to facilitate the comprehension of the law of causality.--3. Wolf, as we have said, distinguishes a PRINCIPIUM COGNOSCENDI, and refers also under _causa_ to a _causa impulsiva, sive ratio voluntatem determinans_. § 11. _Philosophers between Wolf and Kant._ Baumgarten repeats the Wolfian distinctions in his "Metaphysica," §§ 20-24, and §§ 306-313. Reimarus, in his "Vernunftlehre,"[41] § 81, distinguishes 1. _Inward reason_, of which his explanation agrees with Wolf's _ratio essendi_, and might even be applicable to the _ratio cognoscendi_, if he did not transfer to things what only applies to conceptions; 2. _Outward reason_, i.e. _causa_.--§ 120 _et seqq._, he rightly defines the _ratio cognoscendi_ as a condition of the proposition; but in an example, § 125, he nevertheless confounds it with cause. [41] Doctrine of Reason. Lambert, in the new Organon, does not mention Wolf's distinctions; he shows, however, that he recognizes a difference between reason of knowledge and cause;[42] for he says that God is the _principium essendi_ of truths, and that truths are the _principia cognoscendi_ of God. [42] Lambert, "New Organon," vol. i. § 572. Plattner, in his Aphorisms, § 868, says: "What is called reason and conclusion within our knowledge (_principium cognoscendi, ratio--rationatum_), is in reality cause and effect (_causa efficiens--effectus_). Every cause is a reason, every effect a conclusion." He is therefore of opinion that cause and effect, in reality, correspond to the conceptions reason and consequence in our thought; that the former stand in a similar relation with respect to the latter as substance and accident, for instance, to subject and predicate, or the quality of the object to our sensation of that quality, &c. &c. I think it useless to refute this opinion, for it is easy to see that premisses and conclusion in judgments stand in an entirely different relation to one another from a knowledge of cause and effect; although in individual cases even knowledge of a cause, as such, may be the reason of a judgment which enunciates the effect.[43] [43] Compare § 36. of this treatise. § 12. _Hume._