With these precedents to guide them, the several writers on Logic belonging to Kant's school; Hofbauer, Maass, Jakob, Kiesewetter and others, have defined pretty accurately the distinction between reason and cause. Kiesewetter, more especially, gives it thus quite satisfactorily:[45] "Reason of knowledge is not to be confounded with reason of fact (cause). The Principle of Sufficient Reason belongs to Logic, that of Causality to Metaphysics.[46] The former is the fundamental principle of thought; the latter that of experience. Cause refers to real things, logical reason has only to do with representations." [45] Kiesewetter, "Logik," vol. i. p. 16. [46] _Ibid._ p. 60. Kant's adversaries urge this distinction still more strongly. G. E. Schultze[47] complains that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is confounded with that of Causality. Salomon Maimon[48] regrets that so much should be said about the sufficient reason without an explanation of what is meant by it, while he blames Kant[49] for deriving the principle of causality from the logical form of hypothetical judgments. [47] G. E. Schultze, "Logik," § 19, Anmerkung 1, und § 63. [48] Sal. Maimon, "Logik," p. 20, 21. [49] _Ibid._ "Vorrede," p. xxiv. F. H. Jacobi[50] says, that by the confounding of the two conceptions, reason and cause, an illusion is produced, which has given rise to various false speculations; and he points out the distinction between them after his own fashion. Here, however, as is usual with him, we find a good deal more of self-complacent phrase-jugglery than of serious philosophy. [50] Jacobi, "Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza," Beilage 7, p. 414. How Herr von Schelling finally distinguishes reason from cause, may be seen in his "Aphorisms introductory to the Philosophy of Nature,"[51] § 184, which open the first book of the first volume of Marcus and Schelling's "Annals of Medecine." Here we are taught that gravity is the _reason_ and light the _cause_ of all things. This I merely quote as a curiosity; for such random talk would not otherwise deserve a place among the opinions of serious and honest inquirers. [51] "Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie." § 14. _On the Proofs of the Principle._