On the Nature of Thought: Or, The act of thinking and its connexion with a perspicuous sentenceHaslam, John
Philosophy
On the Nature of Thought: Or, The act of thinking and its connexion with a perspicuous sentence
Haslam, John
Thought and thinking
All popular and settled notions, however unfounded, like prejudices
early imbibed, are with difficulty eradicated. Among these may be
instanced the dictum of the astonishing rapidity of Thought, which is
almost proverbial, and generally believed: even Mr. TOOKE, Vol. I., p.
28, conforms to this established maxim. "Words have been called
_winged_: and they well deserve that name, when their abbreviations are
compared with the progress which speech could make without these
inventions; but when compared with the _rapidity_ of _thought_, they
have not the smallest claim to that title." By calculation, the progress
of light from the sun and other luminaries is said to be ascertained;
and likewise the rate at which sound travels: but hitherto no
contrivance has been fabricated to estimate the rapidity of thought. If
the succession of our thoughts should be more rapid than they can be
distinctly apprehended, confusion must ensue, and their rapidity would
render them useless. Our perceptions are regulated by the same law. If
the prismatic colours be painted on a surface which is revolved with
great rapidity, the individual colours will not be apparent. The
succession of sounds to a definite number, may be severally
distinguished, in a certain interval: but if the succession be
increased beyond the power of discrimination, they will impress the ear
as one uniform sound. The same principle must regulate our thoughts,
whether they be composed of Ideas or words, or, if it be possible, of
both jumbled together. It does not appear that our thoughts for any
useful purpose, which must imply their communication to others, or for a
record in written characters, _can_ be more rapid than the intelligible
pronunciation of the words themselves, and which, when delivered in
quick succession, leave the short-hand-writer behind.[7]
As Ideas can be nothing more than the mere phantasms attendant on visual
perception, which, like the perceptions of the other senses, are
commuted for words, that, by the aid of memory, recall in their absence
the objects that have been perceived; it would be difficult to suppose
that Ideas could fortuitously or voluntarily assemble in a more rapid
succession, than the words for which they have been commuted, without
producing confusion. It frequently happens to inexperienced persons, in
giving evidence before a legal tribunal, or in addressing a popular
assembly, that they cannot proceed; and they are generally disposed to
interpret this failure, to their thoughts occurring in a succession too
rapid for their utterance. Allowing the apology to be correct, it is a
proof that such rapidity is inconvenient, and renders the Thought wholly
useless if it cannot be communicated.
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