On the theory of the infinite in modern thought : $b Two introductory studiesJourdain, Eleanor F. (Eleanor Frances)
Philosophy
On the theory of the infinite in modern thought : $b Two introductory studies
Jourdain, Eleanor F. (Eleanor Frances)
Infinite; Knowledge, Theory of; Pragmatism
Another form, and a very scholarly one, of the argument against
the existence of an Absolute has been stated by Bax in the “Roots
of Reality.” He appears to have reached the conclusion that the
_telos_, the goal of human thought, is not an Absolute involving
any notion of fixity, but that it may be conceived of as a “moving
synthesis.” He argues that everything of which we are conscious in
the universe is seen against a background which itself moves, and
is only realisable or distinguishable if it shifts upon something
relatively motionless behind it. He concludes, therefore, that by
analogy there is no Absolute, since what we perceive always implies
something against which we perceive it; thus that there is no goal by
which and at which the spirit of man can find rest. On his theory we
could never claim to reach the conception of an Absolute, though he
admits the progressive character of human thought, and the increasing
reach, lucidity, and depth of the human mind. The true answer to this
argument is that it proves exactly what it sets out to disprove.
As it is acknowledged that only the permanent or the relatively
permanent can produce the phenomena of change, so _the appearance
of the goal of thought as a moving synthesis would presuppose an
Absolute as a ground reality_.[19]
If in truth we were able to apprehend entirely the source of all
life and the background of all experience, we might say that it did
not exist for us _as an Absolute_, but the fact that whatever we
perceive postulates an unending series behind it, carries with it
the proof of an Absolute Infinite. (This conclusion is led up to by
the mathematician’s idea of the series of all finite and transfinite
ordinal numbers.) Some part of this argument has been already
suggested in Ormond’s “Foundations of Knowledge,” and so far was used
by Mr. Illingworth in the “Doctrine of the Trinity.”[20]
“From a deeper metaphysical point of view it is the concept of
evolution itself that must submit to the determination of knowledge,
for it will be found that in so far as it becomes epistemologically
necessary to ground relative processes in an Absolute experience,
just so far will it become necessary also to connect the evolutionary
aspect of the world itself with a ground reality that is stable,
and involves the flux of change only as transcending and including
it.”[21]
The further answer that any judgment, even the Pragmatist’s “judgment
of value,” implies an Absolute has been stated in his Oxford
Lectures[22] by Professor H. Jones.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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