In this entire campaign after these deserters, success was dependent, not upon any study or knowledge of tactics, strategy, or any game of war, but largely upon good, common sense, sound judgment--almost intuition--a ready resourcefulness and quick, decisive action-- It was practically outside of a theoretical conception of any war problem--as we understand it, but included within the scope of its practical activities. No book has ever been written, or ever will be, which could begin to lay down any cut and dried plan of action, rules, or any fundamental principles in a case like this, or hundreds of other cases similar to the performance of such special duties, any more than a text book could have been written prior to 1914 on how to deal with the German methods of conducting a war for the subjugation of the world by trench, barbed wire and dug-out systems along the Hindenberg lines, etc. All the study of a life time involving such problems, or military knowledge, would be of no avail to some men,--whether civilians or soldiers--unless they possessed, at the same time, plenty of resourcefulness and horse sense and could readily adjust themselves to the ever changing conditions of those same problems. The factors never remain fixed or constant. It is the same in battle and with the factors controlling it--which accounts for the lack of success of many so called soldiers by their failure to get away from fixed rules. There is one word that seems to involve the main spring of a soldier's action in all such emergencies--and that is--_Experience_--and the practical application of that experience to all of the problems of life whether great or small, but especially in puzzling situations like this, where the factors are dependent on no fixed rules--are never constant--and therefore events so shape themselves in such rapid succession that without quick, decisive action based upon one's resources and sound judgment gained by experience--the dependence upon study of any books which might bear in any way upon such conditions would, not only prove a most ridiculous farce, but would be offering a premium on commonplace student soldiers--obtuseness and asinine stupidity. There is such a thing in the development of a soldier along certain lines for practical work, as _over education_, as well as _over training_-- In the one case he thinks he knows so much that he cannot be taught any more, and is apt, therefore, to eliminate entirely the element of common sense--the one factor for success upon which he must largely depend--and to neglect to apply some of the most simple and practical principles in his earlier education--and, in the other case he may go stale, and lose much of his spirit, enthusiasm and energy while waiting to test out his knowledge in the real field of endeavor and practical experience. Soldiers Not Born