Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
And as a matter of fact perhaps the first great common and most obvious
feature which strikes the mind reflecting on the visible universe is the
feature of all-pervading change (κίνησις), movement, evolution, progress
and regress, growth and decay; we see it everywhere in a variety of forms,
mechanical or local change, quantitative change, qualitative change, vital
change. Now the knowledge acquired by the study of things under this
common aspect is called _Physics_. Here the mind abstracts merely from the
individualizing differences of this change in individual things, and fixes
its attention on the great, common, sensible aspect itself of visible
change.
But the mind can abstract even from the sensible changes that take place
in the physical universe and fix its attention on a _static_ feature in
the changing things. This static element (τὸ ἀκίνητον), which the
intellect apprehends in _material_ things as naturally inseparable from
them (ἀκίνητον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χωριστόν), is their _quantity_, their extension in
space. When the mind strips a material object of all its visible, sensible
properties—on which its mechanical, physical and chemical changes
depend—there still remains as an object of thought a something formed of
parts outside parts in three dimensions of space. This _abstract_
quantity, _quantitas intelligibilis_—whether as continuous or
discontinuous, as _magnitude_ or _multitude_—is the proper object of
_Mathematics_.
But the mind can penetrate farther still into the reality of the material
data which it finds endowed with the attributes of change and quantity: it
can eliminate from the object of its thought even this latter or
mathematical attribute, and seize on something still more fundamental. The
very essence, substance, nature, being itself, of the thing, the
underlying subject and root principle of all the thing’s operations and
attributes, is something deeper than any of these attributes, something at
least mentally distinct from these latter (τὸ ἀκίνητον και χωριστόν): and
this something is the proper object of man’s highest speculative
knowledge, which Aristotle called ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, _philosophia prima_,
the _first_ or _fundamental_ or _deepest_ philosophy.(15)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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