Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
Now truth is attributed both to knowledge and to things. We say that a
person thinks or judges _truly_, that his knowledge is _true_ (or correct,
or accurate), when things really are as he thinks or judges them to be.
The truth which we thus ascribe to knowledge, to the mind interpreting
reality, is _logical_ truth: a relation of concord or conformity of the
mind interpreting reality—or, of the mind’s judgment about reality—with
the reality itself.(162) Logical truth is dealt with in Logic and
Epistemology. We are concerned here only with the truth that is attributed
to reality, to things themselves: ontological, metaphysical,
transcendental truth, as it is called. There is nothing abstruse or
far-fetched about the use of the terms “true” and “truth” as equivalent to
“real” and “reality”. We speak of “true” gold, a “true” friend, a
“veritable” hero, etc. Now what do we mean by thus ascribing truth to a
thing? We mean that it corresponds to a mental type or ideal. We call a
liquid true wine or real wine, for instance, when it verifies in itself
the definition we have formed of the nature of wine. Hence whenever we
apply the terms “true” or “truth” to a thing we shall find that we are
considering that thing not absolutely and in itself but in reference to an
idea in our minds: we do not say of a thing simply that it is true, we say
that it is _truly such or such_ a thing, _i.e._ that it is really of a
certain nature already conceived by our minds. If the appearance of the
thing suggests comparison with some such ideal type or nature, and if the
thing is seen on examination not really to verify this nature in itself,
we say that it is not really or truly such or such a thing: _e.g._ that a
certain liquid is not really wine, or is not true wine. When we have no
such ideal type to which to refer a thing, when we do not know its nature,
cannot classify and name it, we have to suspend our judgment and say that
we do not know what the thing _really_ is. Hence, for example, the new
rays discovered by Röntgen were called provisionally “X rays,” their real
nature being at first unknown. We see, then, that real or ontological
truth is simply reality considered as conformable with an ideal type, with
an idea in the mind.
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