We see, therefore, what subsistence does for a complete individual nature in the _static_ order. It makes this nature _sui juris_, incommunicable, and entirely independent in the mode of its actual being: leaving untouched, of course, the essential dependence of the created “subsisting thing” or “person” on the Creator. In the _dynamic_ order, the order of activity and development, subsistence makes the complete individual nature not only the ultimate principle _by which_ all the functions of the individual are discharged, but also the ultimate principle or agent _which_ exercises these functions: while the nature _as such_ is the ultimate _principium_ QUO, the nature _as subsisting_ is the ultimate _principium_ QUOD, in regard to all actions emanating from this nature. Hence the scholastic aphorism: _Actiones sunt suppositorum_. That is, all actions emanating from a complete individual nature are always ascribed and attributed to the latter _as subsisting_, to the “subsisting thing” or “person”. In regard to an individual human person, for instance, whether his intellect thinks, or his will resolves, or his imagination pictures things, or his eyes see, or his hand writes, or his stomach digests, or his lungs breathe, or his head aches, it is the _man_, the _person_, properly, that discharges or suffers all these functions, though by means of different faculties, organs and members; and it is to him properly that we ascribe all of them.(287) Now the individual human person is neither his soul, nor his body, nor even both conceived as two; he is _one_ being, one complete substance or nature composed partly of a spiritual principle or soul and partly of a material principle which the soul “informs” and so constitutes a living human body. Hence the human soul itself, whether we consider it as united to the material principle in the living human person, or as disembodied and separate from its connatural material principle, is not a complete substance, is not capable of _subsisting_ and having its human activities referred ultimately to itself as the subsisting, personal principle which elicits these activities. No doubt the disembodied soul has actual _existence_, but it has not the perfection of _subsistence_ or _personality_: it is not a complete individual of the human species to which it belongs, and therefore it cannot be properly called a human person, a complete subsisting individual of the human species.(288)