These paragraphs will have shown with sufficient clearness why we should regard being not as an univocal but as an analogical concept, when referred to God and creatures, or to substance and accident. For the rest, the divergence between the Scotist and the Thomist views is not very important, because Scotists also will deny that being is a genus of which the infinite and the finite would be species; finite and infinite are not _differentiae_ superadded to being, inasmuch as each of these differs _by its whole reality_, and not merely by a determining portion, from the other; it is owing to the limitations of our abstractive way of understanding reality that we have to conceive the infinite by first conceiving being in the abstract, and then mentally determining this concept by another, namely, by the concept of “infinite mode of being”(62); the infinite, and whatever perfections we predicate formally of the infinite, transcend all _genera_, _species_ and _differentiae_, because the distinction of being into infinite and finite is prior to the distinction into genera, species and differentiae; this latter distinction applying only to finite, not to infinite being.(63) The observations we have just been making in regard to the analogy of being are of greater importance than the beginner can be expected to realize. A proper appreciation of the way in which being or reality is conceived by the mind to appertain to the data of our experience, is indispensable to the defence of Theism as against Agnosticism and Pantheism. 3. REAL BEING AND LOGICAL BEING.—We may next illustrate the notion of being by approaching it from another standpoint—by examining a fundamental distinction which may be drawn between _real being_ (_ens reale_) and _logical being_ (_ens rationis_).