(_c_) _Necessary Being and Contingent Beings._—Necessary being we conceive as that being which exists of necessity: being which if conceived at all cannot be conceived as non-existent: being in the very concept of which is essentially involved the concept of actual existence: so that the attempt to conceive such being as non-existent would be an attempt to conceive what would be self-contradictory. Contingent being, on the other hand, is being which is conceived not to exist of necessity: being which may be conceived as not actually existent: being in the concept of which is not involved the concept of actual existence. The same observations apply to this distinction as to the preceding one. It is obvious that any being which we regard as actual we must regard either as necessary or as contingent; and, secondly, that necessary being must be considered as absolutely independent, as having its actual existence _from itself_, by its own nature; while contingent being must be considered as dependent for its actual existence on some being _other_ than itself. Hence necessary being is termed _Ens a se_, contingent being _Ens ab alio_. (_d_) _Absolute Being and Relative Beings._—In modern philosophy the terms “absolute” and “relative,” as applied to being, correspond roughly with the terms “God” and “creatures” in the usage of theistic philosophers. But the former pair of terms is really of wider application than the latter. The term _absolute_ means, etymologically, that which is loosed, unfettered, disengaged or free from bonds (_absolutum_, _ab-solvere_, _solvo_ = _se-luo_, from λύω): that, therefore, which is not bound up with anything else, which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent; while the _relative_ is that which is in some way bound up with something else, and which is so far not self-sufficing or independent. That, therefore, is _ontologically_ absolute which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent of other things, _in its existence_; while the ontologically relative is that which depends in some real way for its existence on something else. Again, that is _logically_ absolute which _can be conceived and known by us without reference to anything else_; while the logically relative is that which we can conceive and know only through our knowledge of something else. And since we usually name things according to the way in which we conceive them, we regard as absolute any being which is _by itself_ and _of itself_ that which we conceive it to be, or that which its name implies; and as relative any being which is what its name implies only _in virtue of some relation_ to something else.(69) Thus, a man is a _man_ absolutely, while he is a _friend_ only relatively to others.