English statesmen had adopted this policy in fact, if unavowedly--perhaps even to some extent unconsciously--when they first entered into, and afterwards confirmed, the Triple Entente. And having once entered into the Triple Entente it was obvious that, without risking still graver consequences, we could never resume the detached position which we occupied before we took that step. It is difficult to {248} believe--seeing how the danger of German predominance threatened France and Russia as well as ourselves--that we should not have excited the ill-will of those two countries had we refused to make common cause by joining the Triple Entente. It was obvious, however, to every one that we could not afterwards retire from this association without incurring their hostility. If we had withdrawn we should have been left, not merely without a friend in Europe, but with all the chief Powers in Europe our enemies--ready upon the first favourable occasion to combine against us. There is only one precedent in our history for so perilous a situation--when Napoleon forced Europe into a combination against us in 1806. And this precedent, though it then threatened our Empire with grave dangers, did not threaten it with dangers comparable in gravity with those which menaced us a century later. The consequences of breaking away from the Triple Entente were sufficiently plain. "We may build ships against one nation, or even against a combination of nations. But we cannot build ships against half Europe. If Western Europe, with all its ports, its harbours, its arsenals, and its resources, was to fall under the domination of a single will, no effort of ours would be sufficient to retain the command of the sea. It is a balance of power on the continent, which alone makes it possible for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of the balance of power is vital to our superiority at sea, which again is vital to the security of the British Empire."[2] {249} Security in the widest sense was the ultimate end of our policy--security of mind, security from periodic panic, as well as actual military security. Looked at more closely, the immediate end was defence--the defence of the British Empire and of the United Kingdom. [Sidenote: DEFENCE AND INVASION] In the existing condition of the world a policy of 'splendid isolation' was no longer possible. Conditions with which we are familiar in commercial affairs, had presented themselves in the political sphere, and co-operation on a large scale had become necessary in order to avoid bankruptcy. England had entered into the Triple Entente because her statesmen realised, clearly or vaguely, that by doing so we should be better able to defend our existence, and for no other reason.