In Part II.--_The Spirit of German Policy_--an attempt has been made to understand the ambitions of our chief antagonist, and to trace the manner in which these ambitions have been fostered, forced, and corrupted by a priesthood of learned men. The relations which exist between this Pedantocracy and the Bureaucracy, the Army, the Rulers, and the People of Germany have been examined. It would appear that under an academic stimulus, healthy national ambitions have become morbid, have resulted in the discovery of imaginary grievances, and have led the Governing Classes of Germany to adopt a new code of morals which, if universally adhered to, would make an end of human society. On the other hand, it would also appear that the German People have accepted the policy of their rulers, without in any way accepting, or even understanding, the morality upon which this policy is founded. It is also important for us to realise the nature of the judgment--not altogether unjustified--which our enemies have passed upon the British character, and upon our policy and institutions. In Part III.--_The Spirit of British Policy_--our own political course since the beginning of the century has been considered--the difficulties arising out of the competition for priority between aims which are {xi} not in themselves antagonistic: between Social Reform, Constitutional Reform, and Imperial Defence--the confusion which has resulted from the inadequacy of one small parliament, elected upon a large variety of cross issues, for dealing with these diverse needs--the lowering of the tone of public life, the depreciation in the character of public men, which have come about owing to these two causes, and also to a third--the steadily increasing tyranny and corruption of the party machines. The aim of British Foreign Policy has been simply--Security. Yet we have failed to achieve Security, owing to our blindness, indolence, and lack of leadership. We have refused to realise that we were not living in the Golden Age; that Policy at the last resort depends on Armaments; that Armaments, to be effective for their purpose, must correspond with Policy. Political leaders of all parties up to the outbreak of the present war ignored these essentials; or if they were aware of them, in the recesses of their own consciousness, they failed to trust the People with a full knowledge of the dangers which threatened their Security, and of the means by which alone these dangers could be withstood.