To these questions there was no answer which carried authority; the official oracles were dumb. We are a democratic country, and yet none of our rulers had ever yet spoken plainly to us. None of the Secretaries for War, none of the Prime Ministers since the beginning of the century, had ever stated the issue with uncompromising simplicity, as the case required. None of them had ever taken the country into his confidence, either as to the extent of the danger or as to the nature of the remedy. It is necessary to assume--in the light of subsequent events--that these statesmen had in fact realised the danger, and were not ignorant of the preparations which were required to forestall it. Certainly it is hard to believe otherwise; but at times, remembering their speeches and their acts, one is inclined to give them the benefit, if it be a benefit, of the doubt. [Sidenote: BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS] The question at issue was in reality a graver matter than the security of the United Kingdom or the British Empire. The outlook was wider even than this. The best guarantee for the preservation of the peace of Europe, and of the World, would have been a British army proportionate to our population and resources. There could be no doubt of this. For half a century or more we had, half unconsciously, bluffed Europe into the belief that we did in fact possess such an army; but gradually it had become {315} plain that this was not the case. Since the Agadir incident the real situation was apparent even to the man in the street--in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the Hague, Vienna, Rome, and Petrograd--in every capital, indeed, save perhaps in London alone. If England had possessed such an army as would have enabled her to intervene with effect in European affairs, she would almost certainly never have been called upon to intervene.[2] Peace in that case would have preserved itself. For Europe knew--not from our professions, but from the obvious facts, which are a much better assurance--that our army would never be used except for one purpose only, _to maintain the balance of Power_. She knew this to be our only serious concern; and, except for the single nation which, at any given time, might be aiming at predominance, it was also the most serious concern of the whole of Europe. She knew us to be disinterested, in the diplomatic sense, with regard to all other European matters. She knew that there was nothing in Europe which we wished to acquire, and nothing--save in the extreme south-west, a rock called Gibraltar, and in the Mediterranean an island called Malta--which we held and were determined to maintain. In the chancelleries of Europe all this was clearly recognised. And more and more it was {316} coming to be recognised also by the organs of public opinion on the Continent.