The British 'Expeditionary Force' 252 Numbers as a test of adequacy 253 Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war 254 Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers 256 Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers 256 Germany would then endeavour to crush France 257 Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose 257 Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest 258 Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany 259 Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales 260 Our armaments did not correspond with our policy 261 Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' 261 Three periods of war--the _onset_, the _grip_, and the _drag_ 263 In 1870 the _onset_ decided the issue 264 By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased 265 Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) 266 Immense value of British sea-power 266 No naval success, however, can win a European war 267 Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security 268 CHAPTER VI THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914) Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 269 Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within a year 270 Inability of France to counter this effort unaided 270 French increase could not take effect till 1916 271 Russian and Austrian increases 272 No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength 273 Balkan wars (1912-1913) 273 Their effect on _Balance of Power_ 274 Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration 275 Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 275 CHAPTER VII A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS