The _mobilization_ of a Unit for war may be defined as providing it with the men and animals required to complete its War Establishment, and with its _War Outfit_, or the matériel of all kinds with which it has to be furnished for War. This War Outfit is in the British Service considered under the following heads: (_a_) The _Personal Kit_ of each soldier--that is, his _clothing_ and small _necessaries_. (_b_) _War Equipment_, which is _personal_ or _regimental_. _Personal Equipment_ comprises the Arms and Ammunition carried, and the Accoutrements worn, by each soldier. _Regimental Equipment_ comprises guns, reserve of ammunition, vehicles, harness, saddlery, stationery, butchery and cooking utensils. (_c_) _Regimental Supplies_ of food and forage. (_d_) The _Medical and Veterinary Equipment_ allotted to the Unit. These Establishments are laid down for the most important, or the most likely, wars which the nation may have to wage. They represent the normal requirements, which are those of a campaign in a civilized country, and in a temperate climate. The tables would be altered in the case of war under other conditions, such as in hot or cold climates or seasons, in mountain warfare, in fighting savages, in quelling civil insurrection, or when a force is designed for special and limited operations, such as a raid, or the capture of an oversea fortress. Instances of such improvised organization may be found in most British campaigns of the past two centuries, and of late years in the Expeditionary Forces sent by France to Madagascar, by the United States to Cuba, and by Germany to South-West Africa. STATES AND RETURNS War Establishments by no means represent the real strength during a war. It may happen that the Army engages in the war without its war establishment being completed. But even if each unit were at its correct war establishment when entering on the campaign, this will not long represent its actual strength. Sick and stragglers waste the ranks daily. After fighting, the missing, wounded, and dead have to be deducted. From time to time reinforcements are added in irregular numbers. Besides the wastage of units, the whole force at the front is apt to become reduced by detachments being taken to guard communications, to escort prisoners or convoys, to garrison fortresses, or to undertake sieges. Napoleon considered that out of every 8 men in an army, only 5 could be counted on as available for the decisive battle of the war.