And the directors of our great banking institutions, as the ultimate judges of bank credit, exercise today a function no less important to the country’s welfare than that of the judges of our courts, the interstate commerce commissioners, and departmental heads. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION In the proposals for legislation on this subject, four important questions are presented: 1. Shall the principle of prohibiting interlocking directorates in potentially competing corporations be applied to state banking institutions, as well as the national banks? 2. Shall it be applied to all kinds of corporations or only to banking institutions? 3. Shall the principle of prohibiting corporations from entering into transactions in which the management has a private interest be applied to both directors and officers or be confined in its application to officers only? 4. Shall the principle be applied so as to prohibit transactions with another corporation in which one of its directors is interested merely as a stockholder? CHAPTER IV SERVE ONE MASTER ONLY The Pujo Committee has presented the facts concerning the Money Trust so clearly that the conclusions appear inevitable. Their diagnosis discloses intense financial concentration and the means by which it is effected. Combination,--the intertwining of interests,--is shown to be the all-pervading vice of the present system. With a view to freeing industry, the Committee recommends the enactment of twenty-one specific remedial provisions. Most of these measures are wisely framed to meet some abuse disclosed by the evidence; and if all of these were adopted the Pujo legislation would undoubtedly alleviate present suffering and aid in arresting the disease. But many of the remedies proposed are “local” ones; and a cure is not possible, without treatment which is fundamental. Indeed, a major operation is necessary. This the Committee has hesitated to advise; although the fundamental treatment required is simple: “Serve one Master only.” The evils incident to interlocking directorates are, of course, fully recognized; but the prohibitions proposed in that respect are restricted to a very narrow sphere. _First:_ The Committee recognizes that potentially competing corporations should not have a common director;--but it restricts this prohibition to directors of national banks, saying: