Under his wise management, and that of the men whom he trained, the little Burlington became a great system. It was “built on honor,” and managed honorably. It weathered every other great financial crisis, as it did that of 1857. It reached maturity without a reorganization or the sacrifice of a single stockholder or bondholder. * * * * * Investment bankers had no place on the Burlington Board of Directors; nor had the banker-practice, of being on both sides of a bargain. “I am unwilling,” said Mr. Forbes, early in his career, “to run the risk of having the imputation of buying from a company in which I am interested.” About twenty years later he made his greatest fight to rescue the Burlington from the control of certain contractor-directors, whom his biographer, Mr. Pearson, describes as “persons of integrity, who had conceived that in their twofold capacity as contractors and directors they were fully able to deal with themselves justly.” Mr. Forbes thought otherwise. The stockholders, whom he had aroused, sided with him and he won. * * * * * Mr. Forbes was the pioneer among Boston railroad-builders. His example and his success inspired many others, for Boston was not lacking then in men who were builders, though some lacked his wisdom, and some his character. Her enterprise and capital constructed, in large part, the Union Pacific, the Atchison, the Mexican Central, the Wisconsin Central, and 24 other railroads in the West and South. One by one these western and southern railroads passed out of Boston control; the greater part of them into the control of the Morgan allies. Before the Burlington was surrendered, Boston had begun to lose her dominion, even, over the railroads of New England. In 1900 the Boston & Albany was leased to the New York Central,--a Morgan property; and a few years later, another Morgan railroad--the New Haven--acquired control of nearly every other transportation line in New England. Now nothing is left of Boston’s railroad dominion in the West and South, except the Eastern Kentucky Railroad--a line 36 miles long; and her control of the railroads of Massachusetts is limited to the Grafton & Upton with 19 miles of line and the Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn,--a passenger road 13 miles long. THE NEW HAVEN MONOPOLY The rise of the New Haven Monopoly presents another striking example of combination as a developer of financial concentration; and it illustrates also the use to which “large security issues” are put.