[30] I altogether disagree with General von Bernardi where he says, p. 157, _Cavalry in War and Peace_: “It is at the same time advisable that a specially detailed cavalry escort should be _dismounted_ for this object.” [31] This is still more applicable in the fight of the cavalry division, since two horse artillery brigades in action occupy a front of 475 yards, and once the guns are in position the direction in which this front faces can only be altered to any appreciable extent by limbering up. [32] General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Staff Ride_, p. 11: “With a force of greater strength than half a squadron, defiles should never be passed at a faster pace than the trot in order that each unit of the force may keep well closed up and the column be not unduly lengthened. After passing through, deployment should be made at a gallop so as to make room for units in rear.” [33] The use of the pompom, as a hint to a flank guard not to spend too long in a specially attractive farmhouse, is an extremist’s view of this question. [34] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_. Speaking of the battle of Colenso, he says: “The cavalry _received no orders_, and did nothing. In the whole day’s fighting the cavalry brigade (six squadrons) lost two men altogether.” May not this want of direction have been due in some degree to the well-known prejudice of the generalissimo against the cavalry arm? [35] Cf. p. 206, Von der Goltz, _Nation in Arms_: “It is not sufficient to have good cavalry, it must also be well handled by the superior authorities. These latter are really responsible for many mistakes unfairly laid at the door of the cavalry. Cavalry divisions must be allowed a proper liberty of action, without entirely slipping out of the hands of the commander-in-chief; whilst the masses of cavalry were formerly kept back to be employed in reserves or in the pursuit, the tendency now exists to send them forward at once, on the first day, to a great distance in a certain direction. This, again, may produce the inconvenience of cavalry being wanting one day when most urgently required. The despatch of squadrons to the front, and the choice of the direction in which they are to proceed, must also be in accordance with a definite plan. Moreover, the commander-in-chief must not only be clear as to his real intentions, but must also communicate them with perfect clearness to the cavalry.” _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 395: “Attempts on the more distant hostile communication may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a zest for victory must be the watchword for every formation, whether great or small.” See also section 104, para. 4, section 110, para. 4, of the British F.S.R.