[36] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 393: “During the battle decisive intervention, whether to support or ward off the hostile attack, is possible only by throwing in large masses of cavalry.” Also see p. 33 of the _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, by General Sir D. Haig, where the co-operation of a cavalry division in ground to some extent obstructed by obstacles is described, and attention is drawn to the historical instances of Salamanca and Austerlitz, in which the co-operation of cavalry was a special feature. [37] See Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, where the greatest stress is laid throughout on the depth of modern dispositions of troops on the battlefield. [38] [This battle will be found well described by Colonel Lonsdale Hale, vol. liv., March 1910, _Journal of R.U.S.I._] It was afternoon on this occasion before the twenty-four guns rightly belonging to the cavalry mass were released from employment alongside the batteries of the general defence and allocated to work with the cavalry. [39] There are few more striking instances of this than the episode at Vionville, where General Frossard, who had desired General de Preuil to make a charge, replied to the latter when he pointed out that the charge was sure to result in failure, “Attack at once, or we are all lost.” [40] The cavalry attack _en route_ to the relief of Kimberley and several other occasions, when General French galvanized the squadrons into action, afford us certain proof that energetic action on the part of one combatant compels the other to take similar action or, as happened in these cases, decamp. [41] “The greatest error that the Russians made before even the outbreak of hostilities, and which continued throughout the course of the campaign, was, notoriously, the underrating of their opponents. It is said that the most influential authorities could not bring themselves, and did not deem it necessary, to detail a sufficient proportion of the good regular cavalry present in European Russia--guards and dragoons--for the theatre of war in Asia. Only three regiments were sent out, of which it may be added the 51st and 52nd Dragoons only reached their destination in the 17th Army Corps area at the end of July 1904. How blameworthy the action of the army leaders was in not devoting more attention to the employment of their best-trained and most reliable cavalry was most conclusively proved by both these regiments of dragoons. For they succeeded, in what the Cossacks up till then had had extremely limited success, namely, in thoroughly clearing up the situation as regards their opponents,...” etc., etc.--Supplement No. 86, _Internationale Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten_. [42] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 81: “The cavalry should be forward and sideward to the line of battle.”