In this matter of attending to the welfare of the horse, however, it must be fully realized when it is permissible and when the horse must be sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation. An instructive example of what far-reaching results may come from ill-judged watering of horses is given in the _American Civil War_, by General Alexander. In June 1864 Grant, after his encounter at Cold Harbour with Lee, undertook the bold step of moving south across the James River and attacking the Confederate right flank. For three days, though the movement was reported to Lee, he would not believe it. On the 15th of June the Federal General Smith, with 1600 men, was moving on Petersburg, a vital point on Lee’s right. Beauregard, the Confederate commander, then had only about 2500 men to hold his extended lines with; he, however, expected reinforcements by night. Every hour’s delay of the Federal advance was therefore invaluable. With one cavalry regiment and a battery he delayed Smith’s column for three hours, and it was not till 5 P.M. that that General had completed his reconnaissance of Beauregard’s position. By 6 P.M. everything was ready for the attack; but it was then found that the Chief of Artillery had sent all the artillery horses to water. This delayed the attack till 7 P.M. It was partially successful, and a portion of the Confederates’ lines were captured; but night came on, and with it the Confederates’ reinforcements. “Petersburg was lost and won by that hour.” That was on the 15th June 1864, and Petersburg did not fall into Federal hands till April 1865. The question, whether the present day greatly-extended rôle of cavalry on the battlefield, hitherto entirely confined to theory, will answer in practice, is a burning one for the horse-master. Without an enormous force of cavalry will there be squadrons available for these services? In Frederick the Great’s army the horses were a first consideration, and he got the greatest results. In Napoleon’s campaigns there is not much evidence of the horses being considered. Frederick saw that the task suited the horse. Napoleon made the horse suit the task or perish in the attempt. The latter’s lost campaigns teach lessons about cavalry which we cavalrymen cannot afford to ignore. Cavalry worn out in the first week of a campaign, with scores of horses scattered along a line of communication in vain efforts to effect some coup, entail a bitter retribution. Campaigns of three weeks’ duration are not the rule, and every extra exertion for which horses are called upon has its price. It is only in the pursuit that we can afford to disregard our horses. CHAPTER IV TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY For the purposes of making this subject plain, the Squadron, the tactical unit, will be first considered.