5. _Advantages of the Echelon Attack._--This form of attack has the following advantages: (_a_) The wheel into line, the least discomposing of evolutions, takes but a few seconds to carry out, and then there is presented a formed body to charge the enemy. (_b_) A succession of formed bodies coming up on the unprotected flank give confidence to the squadron, which feels it is supported by other lines near enough to catch any outflanking enemy. (_c_) An echelon of squadrons, seen from the enemy’s point of view at a distance of three hundred yards, is practically indistinguishable from line. It is, moreover, easier than in forming to the front to abolish all intervals between squadrons; a point of the greatest importance in an attack. (_d_) To be the last to form the attack from a compact formation is a considerable advantage. (_e_) The leader may even be able to change the direction of his mass so as to attack from due east to west. III. THE BRIGADE 6. _Training of Leaders._--Our present squadron leaders, our future brigade and divisional leaders, must be brought up to regard this forming to the flank as the only plan, as second nature; they must believe that if they act otherwise they are voluntarily tying one hand behind their back. Otherwise the maintenance of horse artillery with a view to co-operation with cavalry is almost useless. 7. _Co-operation of R.H.A._--In the cavalry fight horse artillery is the only factor which has assumed totally different proportions in the last ten years (_i.e._ since Q.F. guns were introduced) to those which formerly obtained. Von Schmidt, p. 163, writing in the middle of last century, says: The co-operation of horse artillery with the shock of the cavalry must be a very exceptional occurrence, as when the circumstances of the ground are very favourable, allowing it to act and at the same time protecting it. Nor does it appear that any instance of ideal co-operation between the two arms occurred in the War of 1870. With the old guns the help which horse artillery could give was not great; and consequently co-operation was not practised in peace nor attempted in war. Strange as it may appear, our cavalry officers still find it hard not to deserve the reproach cast upon them by the Duke of Wellington, who, writing after the battle of Salamanca, remarks: “The trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping _at_ everything; they never think of manœuvring before an enemy.”