Further, we feel that the very fact that there are many more occasions suitable for fire action than for shock action must not make us lose sight of this, namely, that though we may use fire action when we meet the enemy nine times out of ten, it is on the tenth occasion, and then because shock action takes place, that something definite, something which affects the result of the campaign, is seen to happen. Therefore we must not let our future leaders be brought up with distorted views. We have to recognize that whilst recourse to shock action demands great resolution, fire action on each successive occasion at an increased distance is always the easy course; whilst the former decides battles and increases our _moral_, the latter is a sign in many cases of the leader weakening, temporizing, or waiting for orders which will never--and _he knows it_--come.[25] We desire to face this question squarely, and with a just appreciation of human nature and its many weaknesses and failings. Nor do we forget the Arab proverb that victory is gained not so much by the numbers killed as by the numbers frightened. It is in view of this that we adopt certain lines in our cavalry training. It appears desirable to give an instance of a case where shock action is decisive. Imagine two brigades of cavalry each with their H.A. Battery meeting on an open plain. Each wishes to get forward. One, Red, determining to use rifle action only, adopts the best formation he can think of, a double echelon formation with his guns either on the flanks well drawn back or in the centre. Dismounting, he prepares to attack. Blue, leaving a fraction of his force in guns and rifles to hold Red to his ground (and cavalry will credit how difficult it is for Red to break off from such an attack), moves round Red’s flank, out of easy range and at speed, and with the remainder of his brigade attacks Red’s flank, choosing the angle at which he will “go in.” Red has of his own accord rendered his mobile force to a great extent immobile; he suffers accordingly. Blue, using gun fire just in advance of his shock action, rolls Red up. It is the fact, that the leaders of both sides instinctively feel that they should not immobilize their commands, which will lead to “mounted combats of cavalry forces.” Scores of actual happenings have convinced those who have been present at them that there is nothing harder to hit than a galloping man and horse; further, that if the mark is men and horses approaching, the fire will be still less effectual. Whether the men firing are under shell fire and their own horses are near them, whether the enemy are armed with a personal weapon, especially a lance or long rapier, each of these factors reduces the number of hits in a way which can only have been seen to be believed.