Be that as it may, after the 1870-71 war the French cavalry had a moving spirit in General Galliffet, and he was well supported by some of the cleverest French military writers. They dissected French and German cavalry action in 1870-71 (and that of cavalry in other wars), laying bare the mistakes and failures of the cavalry of both armies. They saw what was wanted, higher direction and co-ordination of the work of cavalry, so that the two functions of cavalry, information and security (prior to its rôle on the battlefield), might be realized to their full extent. Their deduction from the campaigns of the Napoleonic period was, that that great leader and organizer had discerned the impossibility of co-ordinating these duties; that in his earlier campaigns there were two great units of war, the cavalry of army corps and a corps of reserve cavalry;[48] the latter was composed of numerous light cavalry, acting about a day in front of the columns of the main body. Again, that in 1812, corresponding with the formation of groups of armies, the corps of cavalry was created to act independently, in advance of the general movement of the armies, making a third great unit. They arrived at the conclusion that war brings into play three great units, each of which requires its special cavalry. 1. In front of armies under the generalissimo an independent cavalry, in one or more bodies, to insure liberty of offensive action to the generalissimo. 2. In each army a division of cavalry to ensure to it the liberty of defensive action by giving time to concentrate and take up favourable positions. 3. In each army corps a regiment or half-regiment to ensure tranquillity and freedom from surprise. Nor did they fail to bring to notice that Napoleon’s system was to find a cavalry leader, and let him organize his cavalry to help the plan of campaign, and not to waste his cavalry in a sort of insurance policy. The essence of cavalry is offence, “offensive résolue, offensive quand même offensive à outrance, qui fut le plus souvent la seule règle de tactique,” not defence and shepherding infantry divisions;[49] this latter work does not demand the most highly trained cavalry. By these steps gradually the principle, which is clearly stated in our F.S. Regulations, was arrived at, viz.: The main force of cavalry will usually be organized in one or more cavalry divisions, and retained as the instrument of strategical reconnaissance under the immediate orders of the commander-in-chief.--Part II., British F.S.R., 1909, p. 25. At the present date the French, German, and Austrian organization is practically identical in this respect. All recognize that “we must fight to reconnoitre, and fight to screen.”[50] The rôle of cavalry, as defined at p. 182 of the French _Service de la Cavalerie_, 1909, is as follows: