The outcome is that one arrives at this plain and simple proposition.[52] Only the most highly trained cavalry soldier is worth a horse and food for his horse when a nation is engaged against an enemy of modern continental type. This point is undoubtedly grasped on the Continent, where the proposal to use cyclists as a reserve of riflemen with cavalry is generally accepted. Every one, practically, can now ride and look after a bicycle, and given passable roads, cyclists can travel farther and faster than horses, and carry more days’ reserve rations. In war in a civilized and well-roaded country they cannot fail to be a most useful adjunct to cavalry: (1) as a reserve of rifles, (2) as despatch-riders, (3) as an accessory in outpost and reconnoitring duty. It is not the scheme of this book to enter into the question of training other than regular cavalry, nor to enter into any discussion as to the precise value in war of hastily raised mounted troops; since in doing so one might say something which had the appearance of discouraging the volunteer; whereas there is no question that the spirit, which animated for instance those yeomanry and colonial troops who came out early in the operations in South Africa, 1899-1902, is a great national and imperial asset. At the same time it is right to make it perfectly plain that the non-professional cavalry soldier has an exceedingly hard task before him, and one requiring very exceptional qualities such as are not usually found in those who do not possess the initial asset of being constantly in the saddle and out in the open. Even these must find it extremely difficult to train to anything but a very mediocre standard, unless they possess (i.) sufficient leisure to prepare themselves amidst the surroundings of regular troops, and (ii.) the large amount of patriotism and right feeling which induces a man voluntarily to place himself under and endure the irksome restraints of discipline.[53] Ten times more does this apply to the officer; purely amateur officers are poison (the virus being in direct proportion to their rank), and entirely out of place in war. To imagine that it is patriotism to wait till war begins, and then aspire to lead others, is an idea that should be crushed once for all. It is not patriotism, it is murder. Few amateurs would aspire to conduct the operations in a London hospital, and the operations of war are, in their way, no less intricate, and perhaps entail more loss of life and limb when conducted by the unskilled. The amateur who comes out to the war, with the courage of ignorance, and finds how helpless he is, how useless are his best efforts, how complete the disillusionment of those under him as to his power to keep or get them out of trouble, let alone hurt the enemy, will, if he survives, have learnt a very useful and painful lesson, but no nation can afford to give lessons on the field of battle.