Sniping by nervous sentries, which will always take place the first few nights on which untrained or unseasoned troops are, or think they are, in contact with the enemy (note the Dogger Bank episode with Rozhestvenski’s fleet), must, and can be, at once firmly put a stop to. To do so, give orders that the C.O., adjutant, and regimental sergeant-major of the corps, in whose section of outposts it occurs, are at once to go and spend a couple of hours in the outposts, and then on their return to report whether “all is quiet in the outpost line.” Young men, especially, are apt to get “rattled” when “on sentry go,” and to imagine small bushes and so on are the enemy’s scouts. Even fireflies are known to have been mistaken for the enemy’s lanterns and subjected to a heavy fire. When the fire had ceased, and it became evident that they _were_ fireflies and not the enemy with lanterns, the commander of the picket was much annoyed at receiving an order to “Push in now and kill the remainder with the bayonet.” Sentries had far better rouse the rest of the group quietly in case of the enemy really being on the move towards their picket, and then all may fire a volley at “point blank” range only. It is frequently desirable to impress the enemy with a mistaken estimate of your strength. This might be done by sending a detachment out some hours before dawn towards your base, then before it is light they turn round and march in to your bivouac in full daylight and in sight of the enemy as reinforcements. There are obviously many plans by which an enemy can be deceived as to the strength of your force, if you can work behind cover, by first showing a number of men in one place and then in another. It is well to remember that even if an enemy sees you acting with duplicity the effect is by no means a bad one, as next time he sees you moving in your real direction he may think the action is for his benefit, and covers a movement from an entirely different direction. In the outposts a knowledge of strategy and battle tactics is most necessary, and every officer should try to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the terrain, geography, and strategical issues of the campaign, otherwise he may miss great chances, and his extracts from the information, which he will get first of all, may be valueless instead of being such as will bring him to the favourable notice of his superiors. Nor should his superiors forget the late Admiral Makarov’s opinion, that “a sub-lieutenant acting intelligently and sensibly was more useful to the state than a flag officer who was carrying out to the letter an order which he did not clearly understand.” In regard to terrain, if, as is most probable, the map is on a very small scale, the general direction of the watershed is one of the best general helps in finding the way.