Our Greatest Battle (The Meuse-Argonne)Palmer, Frederick
History
Our Greatest Battle (The Meuse-Argonne)
Palmer, Frederick
Argonne, Battle of the, France, 1918; World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- Western Front
A division with all its artillery, machine-guns, and transport is a
ponderous column in movement, with every part having its regulation
place. One day in one set of villages and the next in another, the
communication of orders and requirements down through all the branches
is difficult, and the more so when you are short of dispatch riders,
and there is a limit to what can be done over the field telephone.
The unexpected demand for wires for our second great offensive must
not find the signal corps unprepared; or a people as dependent on
telephones and telegraph as we are, and so accustomed to having them
materialize on request, would have been helpless in making war. The
deepest tactical concern was, of course, the coördination of the
artillery with the infantry advance. It is only a difference of a
hundred yards' range, as we all know, between putting your shells among
your own men instead of the enemy's.
Reliable communication from the infantry to the aviator and his
reliable report of his observations to the artillery and infantry is
one of the complicated features in that team-play, which, in the game
of death, needs all the finesse of professional baseball, a secret
service, and a political machine, plus the requisite poise, despite
poor food and short hours of sleep, for worthily leading men in battle.
Some divisions that went into this action had not yet received their
artillery; or again their artillery arrived from the training camp,
where the guns had just been received, barely in time to go into
position, so that an inexperienced artillery commander reported to an
inexperienced division commander with whom he had never served. There
were batteries without horses, which the horses of other batteries
pulled into position after they had brought up their own. Battery
commanders received their table of barrages and their objectives of
fire, and, without registering, had to trust to observation by men
untried in battle or by aviators who had never before observed in a big
operation. Aviators had been trained to expect the infantry to put out
panels, and they might say that the infantry did not show their panels,
while the infantry would deny the charge. Such things had happened
before. They would happen this time. They happen to the most veteran
of armies, whose long experience, however, may have an excellent
substitute in other qualities which we had in plenitude, as we shall
see.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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