Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in PhilosophyRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand
Knowledge, Theory of; Logical atomism
There will then be just one perspective in which one of the
new pennies looks circular and the other straight. This will be, by
definition, the place where the original penny was in perspective space.
The above is, of course, only a first rough sketch of the way in which
our definition is to be reached. It neglects the size of the penny, and
it assumes that we can remove the penny without being disturbed by any
simultaneous changes in the positions of other things. But it is plain
that such niceties cannot affect the principle, and can only introduce
complications in its application.
Having now defined the perspective which is the place where a given
thing is, we can understand what is meant by saying that the
perspectives in which a thing looks large are nearer to the thing than
those in which it looks small: they are, in fact, nearer to the
perspective which is the place where the thing is.
We can now also explain the correlation between a private space and
parts of perspective space. If there is an aspect of a given thing in a
certain private space, then we correlate the place where this aspect is
in the private space with the place where the thing is in perspective
space.
We may define "here" as the place, in perspective space, which is
occupied by our private world. Thus we can now understand what is meant
by speaking of a thing as near to or far from "here." A thing is near to
"here" if the place where it is is near to my private world. We can also
understand what is meant by saying that our private world is inside our
head; for our private world is a place in perspective space, and may be
part of the place where our head is.
It will be observed that _two_ places in perspective space are
associated with every aspect of a thing: namely, the place where the
thing is, and the place which is the perspective of which the aspect in
question forms part. Every aspect of a thing is a member of two
different classes of aspects, namely: (1) the various aspects of the
thing, of which at most one appears in any given perspective; (2) the
perspective of which the given aspect is a member, _i.e._ that in which
the thing has the given aspect. The physicist naturally classifies
aspects in the first way, the psychologist in the second. The two places
associated with a single aspect correspond to the two ways of
classifying it. We may distinguish the two places as that _at_ which,
and that _from_ which, the aspect appears. The "place at which" is the
place of the thing to which the aspect belongs; the "place from which"
is the place of the perspective to which the aspect belongs.
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