We cannot allow the success of our own basic plan for peace, _and for safeguarding this nation against war_, to depend on the coöperation of any other nation. That has been the difficulty with nearly every plan heretofore proposed for the permanent establishment of peace throughout the world. The agreement of all the nations could not be had, and without such agreement the plan was futile. Disarmament or the limitation of armaments is impracticable without the consent of all the great powers. Nationalization of the manufacture of armaments, if it is to be a world-wide influence, must have world-wide adoption. No plan for a peace tribunal can be successfully made effective without all nations agreeing to abide by its decrees. And then it will fail unless given power to enforce its decrees. That power will never be vested in it by the nations, not in this generation at least. All plans for arbitration rest on the same insecure foundation. Arbitration voluntarily of any one controversy between nations is practicable, where consent is expressly given to arbitrate that particular controversy. But a general plan based on an agreement made in advance to arbitrate all future unknown controversies would be unenforceable and would afford no assurance of peace. The plan for an international force, either army or navy, is too remote a possibility to be depended on now for practical results. Agitation of these projects is commendable and should be encouraged, but we cannot wait for their adoption to set our own house in order and insure its safety. In framing a national policy of peace for the United States, we must constantly and clearly draw the line of distinction between the deep-seated original causes of war, and causes which are secondary, or merely precipitating incidents. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo precipitated the present war, but it was not the cause of the war. Fundamentally, that cause was the check imposed by other nations on the expansion of the German Empire. The necessity for that expansion resulted from the rapid increase in the population, trade, and national wealth of Germany. The same problem faces the United States with reference to Japan and we cannot evade it by any scheme for arbitration or disarmament. We must squarely face and solve the economic problems that lie at the bottom of all possible conflict between this nation and Japan. A lighted match may be thrown into a keg of gunpowder and an explosion result. It might be said that the match caused the explosion. In one sense it did--_but it was not the match that exploded_. And gunpowder must be protected against matches, if explosions are to be avoided. So with national controversies. The economic causes must be controlled, and conflict avoided by action taken long in advance of a condition of actual controversy.