(c) That ships in convoy would not be attacked by gunfire by submarines. (d) That convoys, being few in number, would be difficult to find and consequently fewer attacks could be made by torpedo. (e) That in the danger zones near ports where submarines would lay for convoys the escort by anti-submarine craft could be made so strong as to make the risk to submarines very hazardous. "The great advantage of the convoy," said he, "was that the ships arrived in the danger zone collectively and at a definite time, where an adequate danger zone escort could be assembled, which was fitted with depth-charges and was in such numbers as to make the chances of submarines extremely small if it attempted to attack the convoy." But, in considering the effect of convoy in lessening sinkings, Admiral Niblack said: I think we should take into consideration, as Admiral Mayo points out, the employment of new and offensive measures through the use of the depth-charges, mystery ships, airships, kite balloons, the laying of mine barrages, the firing of torpedoes from Allied submarines, combined with the use of organized patrols fitted with listening devices and hunting the submarine systematically. * * * * One very important phase of the discussion of the convoy system which has been entirely overlooked is that during the entire war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to Gibraltar. * * * All the rest of the million tons of shipping which crossed from the United States to Gibraltar went across as single ships, going "on their own," as it were. These ships depended on their armed guard gun crews, and were independent of the convoy system. They actually encountered submarines, but they relied on their guns for protection. The convoy system, however, accomplished all that was expected of it, and was markedly successful. It was our destroyers at Queenstown, our forces on the French coast and at Gibraltar, our cruisers escorting convoys crossing the Atlantic, that made it the success it was--and it was one of the most successful measures of the war. President Wilson, as I have said, favored its adoption from the beginning; in fact, wondered why the Allies had not adopted it upon the outbreak of war in Europe. It was one of the first measures recommended by the General Board. But at the time this country entered the war, the Allies were pursuing exactly the opposite method; that is, dispersion of shipping.