These speaking stations were established at various points along the coast. Manned by navy personnel, using a simple code of distance signals, they could communicate with ships not equipped with radio, call vessels into harbor if necessary, and divert them from dangerous localities. They performed a valuable function in expediting the flow of shipping from district to district, as well as, by prompt action, warning craft in danger. Ships at sea received by radio all war warnings and orders, and when it was necessary to divert convoys, orders to change course could be sent at a moment's notice. Far south were two "reporting" stations. Vessels passing out of the Gulf of Mexico coastwise-bound were required to report at Sand Key, those northbound through the Old Bahama passage, to report at Jupiter. [Illustration: THE MERCHANT SUBMARINE DEUTSCHLAND IN BALTIMORE HARBOR Inset: Gun mounted on the U-155, as the Deutschland was called after its conversion into a war craft.] Thus escort was provided for vessels through all the areas in which submarines were likely to operate, and a system provided by which the Navy could keep track of and in touch with them from the time they sailed until they reached port. Though this necessitated a large fleet of escorting vessels, of which our best were at work in Europe, by utilizing all the patrol craft that could be secured and our sturdy little sub-chasers, we managed to provide sufficient escorts. It is a notable fact that, while the submarines sank many schooners and fishing craft and some steamers proceeding independently, during the entire four months in which the U-boats operated in the Western Atlantic not one convoy, coastwise or trans-Atlantic, was attacked off the coast of the United States. The alarm which occurred when the U-boats first appeared quickly subsided. The details of the comprehensive system the Navy had put into effect could not then be published. But the naval committees of Congress knew, for we could impart this information, in confidence, to them. To find out for themselves whether the Navy was doing everything possible to protect shipping and repel the Germans, Senators and Representatives came to the Navy Department, and examined all our plans and arrangements. Senator Lodge well expressed their convictions in his speech in the Senate on June 6th, 1918, when he said: The Navy and the Navy Department have taken every precaution that human foresight could suggest, so far as I am able to judge, and I have examined their preparations with such intelligence and care as I could give to the matter. * * *