"They will win, unless we can stop these losses--and stop them soon," the Admiral replied. "Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked. "Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced. What the British were doing in regard to protecting ships was set forth clearly in Sims' letter of April 19, in which he said: After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and Channels, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity demands. There was considerable criticism of the Admiralty, he said, "for not taking more effective steps," and one of the principal demands was for "convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection within the war zone." But not only officers but ship owners and captains opposed convoy, favoring the arming of merchant vessels and independent sailings, he informed us, saying: The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is: "Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations. In this Sims was right, as was shown when, later, convoy was adopted. The system President Wilson had long advocated, which shipping interests and many naval officers had opposed, proved not only practicable, but a very effective measure. Urging that the maximum number of destroyers and anti-submarine craft be sent to Europe, Sims in his first cablegram informed us: It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our coasts or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon public opinion. We had to expect this and to provide against it; and at the same time extend all possible aid to our Allies in Europe. Destroyers had already been ordered abroad, the first arriving May 4, and others were sent over in rapid succession. Was this quick response? The English so considered it. Sir Edward Carson, First Civil Lord of the Admiralty, called it "speedy action" when he said in his address to the British Navy League on May 17: