"I could see a lighthouse here and there on the Irish and Scotch shores, and though I knew there were plenty of ships about not one was to be seen. (It was night, of course). All at once I saw a dull flare and a moment after a heavy boom. Then about half a mile away the _Tuscania_ stood out in the glare of all the lights suddenly turned on. I could see her painted funnels and the sides clear and distinct against the dark. Another boom and the lights and the ship herself vanished. The next instant lights and rockets began to go up, red and white, and from their position I knew they must be from the _Tuscania_ and that she was falling out of the convoy. Then came a crash of guns and a heavier shock that told of depth-bombs and the blaze of a destroyer's search-lights--gone again in an instant--and then absolute silence." The sinking of the _Antilles_ was followed--October 25, 1917--by an announcement that thereafter bluejackets would man and naval officers command all transports. Up to that time, while there had been naval guards on the transports, the crews and officers of ships had been civilians. It was believed that highly disciplined naval men would be more effective than the constantly shifting crews of civilians. So it has proved. CHAPTER IV Destroyers on Guard--Preparations of Flotilla to Cross the Ocean--Meeting the "Adriatic"---Flotilla Arrives in Queenstown-- Reception by British Commander and Populace--"We are Ready Now, Sir"--Arrival of the Famous Captain Evans on the American Flag-Ship--Our Navy a Warm-Weather Navy--Loss of the "Vacuum" When we entered the war the Navy Department had one definite idea concerning its duty with regard to the submarine. It was felt that it was more necessary to deal drastically with this situation than to meet it merely by building a large fleet of cargo-carrying vessels in the hope that a sufficient number of them would escape the U-boats to insure the carrying of adequate food and supplies to France and the British Isles. The view was taken that, while the ship-building programme was being carried out--there was of course no idea of not furthering the policy embodied in the plea of the British statesman for ships, ships and yet more ships--means should be taken of driving the submarine from the seas. We held the attitude that the nation which had given to the world a weapon so formidable as the undersea fighter had within it the ability to devise a means of combating it successfully. And, as a matter of fact, long before we went into the conflict the Navy Department had not ignored consideration of ways and means in this respect. As a consequence, when the British and French War Commissions arrived in this country they found our naval officers bristling with ideas, some of them apparently so feasible that the British naval representatives were both pleased and astonished.