Our War with Spain for Cuba's FreedomWhite, Trumbull
History
Our War with Spain for Cuba's Freedom
White, Trumbull
Cuba -- History; Spain -- Foreign relations -- United States; Spanish-American War, 1898; United States -- Foreign relations -- Spain
It was an event of the first importance in its own day and
contained lessons of the first moment for the guidance of those
who had to plan the conduct of the war against Spain in 1898. It
proved that American troops under efficient officers could take
the field with success against double their number of Spaniards
fully provisioned and strongly intrenched. It proved that Havana
could be successfully assaulted by a combined military and naval
force, regardless of her picturesque but obsolete fortifications.
Spain's lack of administrative ability in the later war as well as
in the first, destroying any advantage to be derived from balls
and cannon. On the other side it proved that Americans had to look
forward to a considerable loss of life as a result of climatic
conditions, if they attempted to conduct hostile operations in
Cuba during the summer season.
The utter incapacity for straightforward, pertinacious fighting,
which both Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington found in the
Spanish army during the Peninsular war, was as conspicuous fifty
years before, when the Americans took Havana, and may rightly be
argued as perpetually inherent in the national character; for
though the annals of Spain are filled with instances of individual
courage of the first rank, demoralization sets in as soon as they
come together in numbers in the face of a civilized foe. Their
chief maneuver in the course of a century and a half, has been
just plain running away. The victorious Wellington, seeing his
Spanish allies running for dear life just after he had whipped the
opposing French line in the last battle of the peninsular
campaign, was moved to remark that he had seen many curious things
in his life, but never before 20,000 men engaged in a foot race.
Yet the fight made by the Spaniards in Havana during the attack of
the British and colonial forces in 1762 is the one notable
instance of a prolonged struggle between men who speak English and
men who speak Spanish. History may be searched in vain, either in
the old or new world, for a defense as able in point of
generalship or as stubborn in resistance as the Spaniards made at
the siege of Havana. In all other cases, from the Elizabethan
campaigns in Holland to the war with Mexico, the men educated in
the Spanish school of arms have been content to spend their
energies upon a single assault and then flee, sometimes even when
the odds were greatly in their favor.
The English Armada left Portsmouth on March 5th, 1762, under the
command of the gallant Admiral Pococke and Lord Albemarle, the
force moving in seven divisions. It consisted of nineteen ships of
the line, eighteen frigates or smaller men-of-war, and 150
transports containing about 10,000 soldiers, nearly all infantry.
At the Island of Hayti, then called Hispanola, the British were
joined by the successful expedition from Martinique. Together they
sat down before Havana, July 6th, 1762.
SPAIN'S INTELLECTUAL DRY ROT.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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