Outlines of a Critical Theory of EthicsDewey, John
Philosophy
Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
Dewey, John
Ethics
2. _The Loyal Conscience._ But just as the mind, which seems at
first to have the facts and features of the world poured into itself
as a passive vessel, comes in time through its own experience to
appreciate something of their meaning, and, to some extent, to verify
them for itself; so the mind in its moral relations. Without forming
any critical theory of the institutions and codes which are forming
character, without even considering whether they are what they should
be, the individual yet comes at least to a practical recognition that
it is in these institutions that he gets his satisfactions, and through
these codes that he is protected. He identifies himself, his own life,
with the social forms and ideals in which he lives, and repels any
attack upon them as he would an attack upon himself. The demands which
the existing institutions make upon him are not felt as the coercions
of a despot, but as expressions of his own will, and requiring loyalty
as such. The conventional conscience, if it does not grow into this,
tends to become slavish, while an intelligence which practically
realizes, although without continual reflection, the _significance_ of
conventional morality is _free_ in its convictions and service.
3. _The Independent or Reflective Conscience._ The intelligence may
not simply appropriate, as its own, conventions embodied in current
institutions and codes, but may _reflect_ upon them. It may ask: What
is this institution of family, property for? Does the institution
in its present form work as it should work, or is some modification
required? Does this rule which is now current embody the true needs of
the situation, or is it an antiquated expression of by-gone relations?
What is the true spirit of existing institutions, and what sort of
conduct does this spirit demand?
Here, in a word, we have the same relation to the ethical world, that
we have in physical science to the external world. Intelligence is not
content, on its theoretical side, with having facts impressed upon
it by direct contact or through language; it is not content with
coming to feel for itself the value of the truths so impressed. It
assumes an independent attitude, putting itself over against nature and
cross-questioning her. It proposes its own ideas, its own theories and
hypotheses, and manipulates facts to see if this rational meaning can
be verified. It criticises what passes as truth, and pushes on to more
adequate statement.
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