Outlines of a Critical Theory of EthicsDewey, John
Philosophy
Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
Dewey, John
Ethics
2. But the phrase "sum of pleasures" undoubtedly has a meaning--though
the fact that it has a meaning shows the untruth of the hedonistic
psychology. Surrendering this psychology, what shall we say of the
maximum possibility of pleasure as the criterion of the morality
of acts? It must be conceded that this conception does afford some
basis--although a rather slippery one--for the unification of conduct.
Each act is considered now not in its isolation merely, but in its
connection with other acts, according as its relation to them may
increase or decrease the possible sum of future happiness. But this
very fact that some universal, or element of relation, albeit a
quantitative one, has been introduced, arouses this inquiry: Whence
do we derive it? How do we get the thought of a sum of pleasure,
and of a maximum sum? _Only by taking into account the objective
conditions upon which pleasures depend, and by judging the pleasures
from the standpoint of these objective conditions._ When we imagine
we are thinking of a sum of pleasures, we are really thinking of
that totality of conditions which will come nearest affording us
self-satisfaction--we are thinking of a comprehensive and continuous
activity whose various parts are adjusted to one another. Because it is
complete activity, it is necessarily conceived as giving the greatest
possible pleasure, but apart from reference to complete activity and
apart from the objects in which this is realized, the phrase 'greatest
sum of happiness' is a mere phrase. Pleasures must be measured by a
standard, by a yard stick, before they can be summed in thought, and
the yard stick we use is the activity in which the pleasure comes. We
do not measure conduct by pleasure, but we compare and sum up pleasures
on the basis of the objects which occasion them. To add feelings, mere
transitory consequences, without first reducing those feelings to a
common denominator by their relation to one objective standard, is an
impossibility. Pleasure is a sort of sign or symbol of the object which
satisfies, and we may carry on our judgment, if we will, in terms of
the sign, without reference to the standard, but to argue as if the
sign were the thing, as if the sum of pleasure were the activity, is
suicidal.
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