1. _The Motive._ The motive of the act is the end aimed at by the agent in performing the act. Thus the motive of Julius Cæsar in crossing the Rubicon was the whole series of results which he intended to reach by that act of his. The motive of a person in coming to college is to gain knowledge, to prepare himself for a certain profession. The motive is thus identical with the ideal element of the action, the purpose in view. 2. _The Feelings or Disposition._ Some writers speak of the feelings under which the agent acts as his motive. Thus we may suppose Julius Cæsar 'moved' by the feelings of ambition, of revenge, etc., in crossing the Rubicon. The student may be 'moved' by curiosity, by vainglory, by emulation, by conscience, in coming to college. It is better, however, to regard the motive as the reason for which the act is performed, and to use the term moving or impelling cause for the feelings in their relation to action. Thus we may imagine a parent asking a child why he struck a playmate, meaning what was the motive of the action. If the child should reply that he struck his playmate because he was angry, this answer would give the moving cause or impelling force of the action, but not its motive. The motive would be the idea of punishing this playmate, of getting even with him, of taking something away from him. The motive is the end which he desired to reach by striking and on account of which he struck. This is implied by the fact that the parent would ask, "What _made_ you _angry_?" VI. Moral Bearing of These Distinctions. It is the feelings which supply the impelling force to action. They may be termed, collectively, the _natural disposition_. The natural disposition in itself has no _moral_ value. This has been well illustrated by Bentham. Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 49-55. Bentham here uses the term 'motive' to designate what we have called the moving cause. We may select of the many examples which he gives that of curiosity. We may imagine a boy spinning a top, reading a useful book and letting a wild ox loose in a road. Now curiosity may be the 'motive' of each of these acts, yet the first act would generally be called morally indifferent, the second good, the third abominable. What we mean by the 'natural' feelings, then, is the feelings considered in abstraction from activity: Benevolence, as a _mere_ feeling, has no higher moral value than malevolence. But if it is directed upon action it gets a value at once; let the end, the act, be right, and benevolence becomes a name for a _moral_ disposition--a tendency to _act_ in the due way. Nothing is more important than to distinguish between mere sentiments, and feeling as an element in conduct. VII. Relation of Consequences and Conduct.