Every action which is not in the line of performance of functions must necessarily result in self-enslavement. The end of desire is activity; and it is only in fullness and unity of activity that freedom is found. When desires are not unified--when, that is, the idea of the exercise of function does not control conduct--one desire must conflict with another. Action is directed now this way, now that, and there is friction, loss of power. On account of this same lack of control of desires by the comprehensive law of social activity, one member of society is brought into conflict with another, with waste of energy, and with impeded and divided activity and satisfaction of desire. Exercise of function, on the other hand, unifies the desires, giving each its relative, although subordinate, place. It fits each into the others, and, through the harmonious adjustment of one to another, effects that complete and unhindered action which is freedom. The performance of specific function falls also into free relations with the activities of other persons, coöperating with them, giving and receiving what is needed, and thus constituting full liberty. Other aspects of freedom, as the negative and the potential, are simply means instrumental to the realization of individuality, and when not employed toward this, their true end, they become methods of enslaving the agent. On the subject of moral freedom, as, upon the whole, in agreement with the view presented here: See Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 90-117; 142-158. Bradley: Ethical Studies, ch. I; Caird: Phil. of Kant, Vol. II, Bk. II, ch. 3; Alexander: Moral Order and Progress, pp. 336-341. And, for a view agreeing in part, Stephen: Science of Ethics, pp. 278-293. For presentations of the freedom of indifference, see, Lotze: Practical Philosophy, ch. 3. Martineau: Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 34-40. Calderwood: Handbook of Moral Philosophy. PART II. THE ETHICAL WORLD. LIII. The Reality of Moral Relations. The habit of conceiving moral action as a certain _kind_ of action, instead of all action so far as it really is action, leads us to conceive of morality as a highly desirable something which somehow ought to be brought into our lives, but which upon the whole is not. It gives rise to the habit of conceiving morality as a vague ideal which it is praiseworthy for the individual to strive for, but which depends wholly for its existence upon the individual's wish in the matter. Morality, that is, is considered as a relation existing between something which merely _ought to be_, on one hand, and the individual's choice, or his conscience on the other. This point of view has found typical expression in Bishop Butler's saying: "If conscience had might as it has right, it would rule the world."