Outlines of Educational DoctrineHerbart, Johann Friedrich
Philosophy
Outlines of Educational Doctrine
Herbart, Johann Friedrich
Education -- Philosophy
34. Now, in order to gain an adequate knowledge of each pupil’s
capacity for education, observation is necessary--observation both of
his thought masses and of his physical nature. The study of the latter
includes that of temperament, especially with reference to emotional
susceptibility. With some, fear is the first natural impulse, with
others, anger; some laugh and cry easily, others do not. In some cases
a very slight stimulus suffices to excite the vascular system. We need
to note furthermore:--
(1) The games of pupils. Do they in a thoroughly childlike manner still
play with any object that comes to hand? Do they intentionally change
their games to suit a varying preference? Can distinct objects of
persistent desire be discovered?
(2) Their mental capacity and processes as shown in their studies. Is
the pupil able to grasp long or only short series? Does he make many or
few slips in the recitation? Do his lessons find a spontaneous echo in
his play?
(3) Their depth and consistency. Are their utterances superficial, or
do they come from the depths of the soul? A comparative study of words
and actions will gradually answer this question.
Such observations will take account also of the rhythm of the pupil’s
mental life as well as of the character of his store of thoughts. The
insight thus obtained determines the matter and method of instruction.
The reader will not fail to notice that much of modern child study
is anticipated in the foregoing paragraphs. Further important
contributions to the same subject are made in paragraphs 294–329.
35. Instruction in the sense of mere information-giving contains no
guarantee whatever that it will materially counteract faults and
influence existing groups of ideas that are independent of the imparted
information. But it is these ideas that education must reach; for the
kind and extent of assistance that instruction may render to conduct
depend upon the hold it has upon them.
Facts, at least, must serve as material for methodical treatment,
otherwise they do not enlarge even the scope of mental activity. They
rise in value when they become instinct with life and acquire mobility
so as to enrich the imagination. But their ethical effect always
remains questionable so long as they do not help to correct or modify
the ethical judgment, or desire and action, or both.
This point calls for a few additional distinctions. Generally speaking,
rudeness decreases in proportion to the expansion of the mental horizon
by instruction. The mere diffusion of desires over the enlarged
thought area causes them to lose something of their one-sided energy.
Moreover, if instruction presents ethical subjects of some kind in
a comprehensible way, the pupil’s disposition undergoes a refining
process so that it at least approximates a correct estimate of the
will, that is, the creation of ethical ideas.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account